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We thank Moseley and Wilkinson (1) for
their response to our article (2). Our aim
was to contrast mechanisms of auditory
verbal hallucination (AVH) to spur exper-
imental work pitting models against each
other, and we outlined experimental strate-
gies to do so. While we favor a sponta-
neous activation model of AVH, different
models might be needed to explain the
panoply of AVH phenomenology (3). Here,
we reconsider self-monitoring approaches
that identify inner speech as the substrate
of AVH.
We agree with Moseley and Wilkin-
son that inner speech is complex, in part
because the term “inner speech” covers dif-
ferent phenomena. In a broad sense, it
refers to a family of internal experiences of
speech including (1) auditory imagination
of one’s own or another’s speech and (2)
internal articulation of one’s own thoughts
in words [cf. (4); for potential distinctions
in neural basis, see e.g., Ref. (5)]. To clar-
ify our earlier discussion, it was the latter
to which we referred with “inner speech,”
what one could call inner speech in the
narrow sense but which we will refer to
as internal articulation. The challenge for
inner speech theorists is to explain how
one or more of these types of inner speech
yields AVH.
This distinction between imagination
and internal articulation bears on the study
that Moseley and Wilkinson appeal to (6),
which develops a questionnaire for prob-
ing the nature of inner speech. They claim
that “the presence of other people’s voices
is exactly the kind of quality reported in
typical inner speech.” But is this typical?
By far, the largest numbers of respondents
(44%) claim that the presence of other peo-
ple’s voices “certainly does not apply” to
their inner speech. Indeed, the authors of
the study only claim that “25.8% reported
some other people in inner speech” and
of these, only 7.8% claim that it “certainly
applies to me”with the next strongest state-
ment being that it “possibly applies to me”
(8.7%). Furthermore, it is plausible that
the questionnaire taps into the two differ-
ent kinds of inner speech we have iden-
tified. The questionnaire can be divided
into two sets of questions: those formu-
lated with “thinking” and “talking” and
those formulated with “hearing” when ask-
ing about other voices [Table 1 in Ref.
(6)]. The first set might induce subjects
to focus on internal articulation while the
second induces them to focus on episodes
of auditory imagination in which other
voices might typically be experienced. If
so, inner speech as auditory imagination
might typically be of other voices, but it
does not follow that internal articulation
is typically of other voices. It is natural to
think that when one internally articulates
one’s own thoughts, inner speech is typ-
ically in one’s own voice. All this seems
merely terminological, but it is not. The
crucial point concerns not the labels we
use but what the labels refer to, namely
to what precise representations constitute
the substrate of AVH. Given the ambigu-
ity in “inner speech,” any theory invoking
inner speech must specify the internal rep-
resentation that serves as the substrate of
AVH and explain how it yields AVH phe-
nomenology. Only in this way can our
hypotheses and questions be made clear
and precise.
So, is the substrate of AVH internal
articulation or auditory imagery (we set
aside a third possibility, auditory recol-
lection)? In objecting to self-monitoring
theories, we focused on internal articula-
tion, an experience typically in one’s own
voice and lacking certain acoustical features
common in AVH (7). While there is dis-
agreement whether internal articulation is
experienced as having volume [some deny
this (8), some find 20% (9) of queried pop-
ulations acknowledging this, and some as
high as 90% (10)], it does seem that inter-
nal articulation is typically in one’s own
voice where this rules out its exemplify-
ing properties associated with experienced
pitch and timbre distinctive of voices other
than one’s own. Such properties are charac-
teristic of AVH of other voices with specific
genders, accents, and identities (11).
Any account that appeals to internal
articulation as a substrate faces a challenge:
because internal articulation typically lacks
properties associated with the experience
of pitch and timbre distinct from one’s
own voice, self-monitoring accounts must
explain the transformation of that sub-
strate to AVH. “Transformation” here is
used in a computational sense: there must
be a process where the representations
underlying internal articulation without
certain acoustical features yield AVH with
those features, namely those associated
with a distinctive pitch and timbre tied
to another voice. We do not claim that
a transformation mechanism cannot be
given, only that one must be provided. This
has not been done.
Moseley and Wilkinson invoke work
connecting AVH to subvocalization (12),
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which more naturally fits with internal
articulation (“subvocalization” in the liter-
ature seems sometimes to refer to muscular
activation without any produced speech,
sometimes to sub-threshold speech). There
has been little systematic follow-up work,
however, and mixed results nailing down
temporal correlation between muscle activ-
ity and AVH [for an overview, see Ref.
(13)]. Moseley and Wilkinson note work
shown by Bick and Kinsbourne (14) that
in a group of schizophrenic patients, hold-
ing the mouth open during AVH abol-
ished AVH in 72% of the patients. The
putative mechanism, however, is puzzling.
Readers might now try to generate inner
speech while holding their mouths open.
We find that we can do so, so the procedure
does not seem to disrupt inner speech. It
is not clear then how the result aids the
inner speech model. A different explana-
tion is that the patients at issue were in
fact vocalizing, but at low volumes (12).
If those actual sounds were the basis of
AVH, then holding one’s mouth open could
abolish AVH. Technically, however, these
forms of “AVH”would not be hallucination
of non-existent sounds but the misattribu-
tion of actual sounds. We doubt that all
AVH involve actual vocalization and are
thus mislabeled as hallucinations. Green
and Kinsbourne (15) later failed to repli-
cate the earlier result though some recent
work has demonstrated lip muscle activity
by EEG during AVH (16). The relevance of
such activity to testing alternative theories,
however, needs to be clarified.
There are other problems for appeals to
internal articulation. Recently, McCarthy-
Jones et al. (17) surveyed 199 individ-
uals (65 female), 81% of whom were
diagnosed with schizophrenia [the authors
report that “the same 4-cluster structure
(they identify) was found when the analy-
ses were repeated, including only people
with diagnosis of schizophrenia” p. 229
so we assume that the proportions apply
to the schizophrenia subpopulation]. The
data reveal forms of AVH that are dif-
ficult to explain by appeal to internal
articulation as substrate: verbal gibberish
AVH (21% of subjects), non-verbal audi-
tory hallucination (music, animals, water,
etc.; 32%), and multiple voices like a cho-
rus (40%). These are experiences that one
typically does not generate by internal
articulation.
Accordingly, we offered a friendly sug-
gestion to self-monitoring theorists (2):
invoke auditory imagery as the substrate
of AVH [see also Ref. (18)]. It is plausi-
ble that auditory imagery is like auditory
experience in that both experiences repre-
sent acoustical properties such as intensity,
pitch and timbre. Both appear to have a
common basis in neural auditory represen-
tations (19). Thus, we think that between
internal articulation and auditory imagery
of other voices, the latter provides a prima
facie more plausible substrate for AVH.
Having provided a friendly suggestion,
we want to reiterate our main explanatory
challenge to self-monitoring models: they
are explanatorily incomplete at a crucial
stage. The fundamental computation of
most self-monitoring models draws on for-
ward or predictive models from the motor
control literature: the computation of the
error between a predicted and actual signal.
It is in this way that a system is said to mon-
itor and track its outputs as self-produced.
The problem is that computing error is far
removed from the phenomenal properties
characteristic of AVH. Alienness, otherness,
loss of authorship/ownership or self-tags,
and other descriptions characterizing AVH
are phenomenological terms, but their con-
nection to error signals is unclear. After
all, error signals are computed in other
domains having nothing to do with the
phenomenology associated with AVH, say
when in normal reaching, the motor system
generates on-line correction of movement.
Self-monitoring theorists need to close this
gap in the explanation, and we are inter-
ested in clear answers that can be subject to
empirical tests.
The spontaneous activation account
provides straightforward explanations of
some of these features. Consider the expe-
rience of otherness. Simply put, one expe-
riences otherness because the substrate of
AVH represents the voice of another. Mose-
ley and Wilkinson object to this aspect
of our model: “Taken to its extreme, [it]
implies that any episode of inner speech
that involves a voice other than one’s own
would be experienced as ‘non-self,’ and
hence experienced as similar to an AVH,
a proposition that would clearly not find
much support in empirical research.” Yet
an experience of another’s voice by defi-
nition is experience of a non-self and in
that way is qualitatively identical to AVH in
respect of what is experienced: an other.
Trivially, this “other” aspect of AVH is
shared with auditory-based experiences of
non-self voices whether in normal hear-
ing, imagination, dreams, or memory. Each
represents the voice of another. “Other-
ness” (non-self) as characterizing what is
experienced in AVH is not mysterious on
the spontaneous activation account [on
pitfalls regarding talk of otherness; see Ref.
(20) pp. 99–100]. While otherness is often
distinctive of AVH, it is not sufficient to
render AVH the mental disturbance that it
is. Rather, it is also the specificity of content,
acoustical properties, repetition and spon-
taneity of AVH episodes that exacerbate the
negative impact of the symptom.
Moseley and Wilkinson also identify
“the non-self-generated, alien quality asso-
ciated with AVHs” as something to explain
and claim that the spontaneous activ-
ity account cannot explain it. In respect
of “non-self-generated,” the spontaneous
account appeals to the spontaneity of AVH
episodes that, like thoughts or tunes that
pop into one’s head, have the phenome-
nology of not being self-generated. Again,
this account demystifies one aspect of AVH
phenomenology. The alien quality of AVH
is more elusive though it is often invoked
[e.g., Ref. (4); see Ref. (20), p. 89 for more
references]. Like“inner speech,”“alienness”
is hard to pin down. Until it is clear what
it means, it is unclear what one should
explain. This is why we have emphasized
the importance of careful analysis, which is
obligatory in describing complicated phe-
nomenology. Perhaps “alienness” is a gen-
eral expression of what is abnormal in AVH,
but then the next step is to be clear what
those abnormalities are and then to assess
each model’s ability to explain them. “Ali-
enness” is a too vague phenomenal descrip-
tor, and until we better understand what it
refers to, it would be better to not use it as
an explanatory constraint in assessing the-
ories. The first step, then, is to be clear what
alien phenomenology is beyond it signaling
something abnormal.
Moseley and Wilkinson suggest that our
model does worse than self-monitoring
models in explaining the specificity of the
voice in AVH, but we disagree. Indeed, self-
monitoring models have potentially two
forms of specificity to explain: the spe-
cific failure of self-monitoring across types
of inner speech (e.g., internal articulation
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versus imagination) and within each type,
the specific failure of self monitoring for
certain voices or sounds (e.g., auditory
imagination of Barack Obama’s voice that
yields AVH but not imagination of George
Bush’s voice). On the spontaneous activa-
tion account, there will be corresponding
overactivation of relevant auditory repre-
sentations (increases in gamma synchrony
could derive from the inappropriate activa-
tion of the specific neuronal assemblies that
support such representations). All theories
have to deal with the puzzling specifici-
ties associated with AVH (voices more than
non-voices, auditory more than visual hal-
lucinations, etc.). The spontaneous activ-
ity account does not seem worse on this
point.
Finally, our aim was to motivate refine-
ments of the issues by analyzing some
of the key terms, questions, and mecha-
nisms in the investigation of AVH. We agree
with Moseley and Wilkinson that more
work needs to be done on concepts and
mechanisms.
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